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DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the relationship between political
conflict and economic growth in a simple model of endogenous
growth with distributive conflicts. We study both the case of
two llclassesfl (workers and capitalists) and the case of a
continuum distribution of agents, characterized by different
capital/labor shares. We establish several results concerning
the relationship between the political influence of the two
groups and the level of taxation, public investment,
redistribution of income and growth. For example, it is shown
that policies which maximize growth are optimal only for a
government that cares only about the capitalists."Also, we
show that in a democracy (where the "median voter theorem'
applies) the rate of taxation is higher and the rate of growth
lower, the more unequal is the distribution of wealthWe
present empirical results consistent with these implications of
the model.
Alberto Alesina Dani Rodrik
Harvard University Harvard University
NBER and CEPR NEER and CEPRI. Introduction
This paper analyzesa simplemodel of endogenous growth with distributiveconflicts
between labor and capital. The rate of economic growth is determined by policy decisions which
are shaped by the stniggle for distributive shares: we endogenize government policy in a model
of endogenous growth.
We focus on the political conflict between individuals who derive their income from
capital and those who derive their income from labor. The government has two decisions to
make: (i) the rate at which capital is to be taxed; and (ii) the distribution of government
expenditures between productive public investments and lump-sum transfers to workers.
Holding the composition of public expenditure constant, the economy's growth rate is increasing
in taxes on capital for "small" tax rates, and decreasing in taxes for "large' rates. Thus, a
strictly positive tax rate on capital maximizes the economy's growth rate. On the other hand,
holding the tax rate constant, growth is reduced by an increase in redistribution through transfers
to workers, who supply labor inelastically.
We show how these public finance decisions (and therefore growth rates) are determined
in two types of political models. In the first we consider a government which attributes certain
weights to the welfare of two groups in the population, workers and capitalists. We can think
of these weights as being determined by the lobbying or other political activities of the two
groups. In addition to providing a simple, tractable model in which the growth consequences
of distributional conflicts can be analyzed, this framework also leads to several results. First,
we find that maximizing the economy's growth rate is the optimal policy only for a government
that cares only about capitalists. A government that attributes some positive weight (no riiatter2
how small) toworkers'welfare would always choose a growth rate that fails short of the
maximum attainable. Workers always prefer a lower growth rate than capitalists, eventhough
theyfullyinternalize the future benefits of capital accumulation. Second, our model makes clear
that, in general, the growth rate has no normative significance in and of itself: economic growth
and welfare do not go hand in hand.
Third, a time inconsistency emerges whenever capitalists and workers have different
discount rates. In this case a social planner would find it optimal to arbitrage across time: if
workers are more impatient than capitalists, optimal government policy involves a time-varying
pattern of capital taxation, with taxes starting high and decreasing over time, so thai the
economy's growth rate wouLd increase over time. However, this policy is dynamically
inconsistent. The time consistent solution instead implies a constant tax rate and constant
transfers over time, thus a constant growth rate. Relative to the optimal policy, in the time
consistent solution the workers "lose" at the beginning and gain lateron; on the contrary the
capitalists "gain" early and then "lose."
In order to analyze more precisely the relationship between wealth distribution and
growth, we then consider a more general model in which rather than two groups, we have a
distribution of types of individuals identified by their relative shares of labor and capital. We
analyze the choice of the tax on capital made by majority rule and we establish a precise formal
relationship between this version of the model with a continuous distribution of types and the
previous model with only two types. We also show that there exists a monotonic relationship
between wealth inequality and growth; our model implies that democracies with a more unequal
distribution of capital ownership grow less rapidly than more egalitarian democracies. This is3
because the median voter has a relatively small endowment of capital when wealth is unequally
distributed, and thus favors high taxes on capital which keep growth low. We present some
empirical evidence consistent with this result at the end of the paper. Once again, the 'positive'
nature of these results should be stressed: growth and welfare are not the same in our
framework.
Thus, our model extends the new literature on "endogenous growth" (see l3arro and Sa]a
y Martin (1990) and the references cited therein for a survey) by showing how distributional
considerations affect the choice of growth in a political equilibrium. In particular, this paper
builds a bridge between the endogenous growth literature and the literature on majority voting
on tax rates (Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer-Richards (1981)).
Other attempts to introduce distributive issues in models of endogenous growth have
focused on investment in human capital as the engine of development. Galor and Zeira (1989)
focus on credit market imperfections: the "poor" are credit constrained and cannot borrow to
invest in education. A fat tail in the income distribution implies that relatively few people can
become educated, and growth is relatively low. Perotti (1990) studies a model in which the
extent of the investment in education depends upon the initial distribution of income and the
amount of redistribution achieved by income taxes and transfer. In turn the political equilibrium
leading to the choice of the tax rate is influenced by the pre-tax distribution of income. Persson
and Tabellini (1991) also discuss a model of investment in human capital and redistributive
taxation. Our approach and these papers on accumulation of human capital should be viewed
as comptementary an important difference between our paper and this work on human capital4
isthat our paper leads to results having to do with wealthdistributionrather than the personal
incomedistribution.
The plan of our paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the basic modelwith
"workers"and "capitalists."In section 3 we discuss the policies of a government which
maximizes a weighted average of the welfare of the two groups. In section 4 we analyze a more
general case in which rather than two groups, each individual in the economy has a different
labor/capital share. We discuss some empirical evidence in Section 5, The last section
highlights some possible extensions and concludes.
2. A Model with Two "Classes
Consider a one sector closed economy with two groups of individuals, workers and
capitalists. The workers supply labor inelastically and do not save or borrow; in each period
they consume their total income. The capitalists own the capital stock, do not work, consume
and save: these assumptions, then, resemble a "Kaldorian" model of distribution (Kaldor
(1956)). In Section 4 below, we study a model with many types of agents in which everybody
owns some capital and is allowed to save. The production function, adopted from Barro (1990),
is given by:
y =AKaGLL 0 Ca< 1 (1)
In (1), y represents output; A is a parameter representing the "technology' available in this
economy; K is the capital stock and L is labor input. G represents the flow of governmcnt
spending on productive investment or social infrastructure; for concreteness, we can think of G
as the provision of "law and order" services. Throughout the paper we do not explicitly indicate5
thetime dependence of each variable; for instance y should be interpreted as y(t), etc. Also,
we willhenceforthnormalize the economy's labor (L) endowment to one unit. The initial capital
stock, K(O), is exogenously given.
The government always balances the budget by assumption and has a single tax
instrument: a tax (r) on capital. In addition to the expenditure on public investment, (3, the
government may choose to transfer resources to the workers, who, by assumption, are not taxed
(See Section 6 for a brief discussion of taxes on labor income.) We indicate with X E [O,lJ the
share of government revenues which are transferred to workers. Thus, the budget constraint of
the government implies:
G = (1—X)rK (2)
The transfers to the workers are given by XrK. The government chooses X and r.
The representative capitalist faces the following problem:
Max U=(log Ctr'dt (3)
s.t. K=(r—r)K
— (4)
whereCK indicates the capitalist's consumption level and r stands for the marginal product of
capital. The logarithmic specification of utility greatly simplifies the analysis, particularly in
section 4 where a voting model is examined, but the results of this and the next section easily
generalize to any isoelastic utility function, in solving problem (3) and (4), the capitalists take
r as given.
The workers' utility function is given by:6
U' =(logC'-)e'd: (5)
where5 ￿ pandCL represents the workers' consumption. In the next section we will discuss
both the case in which capitalists and workers have the same discount rate (S=p),andthe case
in which they don't —specificallythe case in which the workers are more impatient than the
capitalists (S>p).Givenour assumptions, workers' consumption is given by:
C'w+XrK
where w is the wage, equal to the marginal productivity of labor.
A straightforward exerctse in dynamic optimization shows that the solution of problem
(3)/(4) implies the growth rate of capitalists' consumption is given by:
y = (r-- p)
Byusing the transversaiity condition and the resource constraint, it can be shown that ihe rate
of growth of capital, and of workers' consumption, has to be equal to y.
(8)
CC K7
Using (2), one can show that:7
r= .-X.aA[(1—X)r]°"r(X,r) (9)
w= (1—)A[(1—X)r]°"Kw(X,r)K (10)
Thus, combining (7) and (9) one obtains:
=(aA[(1-X)fl° -r - p)(r,X). (11)
Equation (11) implies that:
<0forevery X (12)
ax
0=r..[c(1-a)A' (13) 3r < >
Equations(12) and (13) underscore that growth is maximized if X =0and r ==
[a(1-a)A]"°.The relationship between growth and r is displayed in Figure 1. We can now
examine the government's choice of r and X.
3. The Government's Problem
The government chooses r and X at every instant in time, in order to maximize a
weighted average of the welfare of the two groups. A basic time inconsistency problem emerges
here:since capital taxation is distortionary, the government could improve welfare by
expropriating the capital stock and then publicly operating it and distributing the pro1ts.( =o
L L
'C-S
Alternatively, the government could expropriate the capital stock and then rent it to the former
capitalists. These policies would achieve the "command° optimum and maximize welfare even
fromthe point of view of a government that cares only about the capitalists.'
Such a solution would be both uninteresting and unrealistic. Since our focus is not on
this particular time-consistency issue, we will rule out expropriation. In effect, we assume that
the only way public services (G) can be financed is through a distortionary tax on income
deriving from privately owned capital.
Under this assumption which rules out expropriation of capital, we can proceed to
analyze the government's problem. It is useful to examine first the problem of a hypothetical
government which completely disregards workers' interests:
Max U" =(logCK)el (14)
r,X
s.t.C" =(r(r,X)-r)K-7(r,X)K (15)
where (15) is obtained by using (4), (7) and (8). The problem can then be rewritten as follows:
Max U" = Log(jiK)e"dz (16)
r,X
s.t. =yfr,X) (17)
Thus, a "capitalist government" will choose the time path of the pair (X,r) which maximizes the
rate of growth y(r,X), namely, as shown above:9
(18) X =0;r=[a(l—a)41"
Let us now consider the proMem of a government that attributes a weight /3 to the
workers and (1-$) to the capitalists, /3 S [0,11. For the moment, we consider /3 as exogenously
given. In Section 4 we will examine a model in which the relative weight attributed to 'labor'
and "capital" is determined endogenously, as a function of the distribution of ownership of
capital and by means of majority voting.
The problem faced by the government is given by:
Max (1 —(3)(log C")e 'dr +/3(log C'-)e 'dt (19)




The Hamiltonian of this problem can be written as follows:
H =(1-(3) log [(pK)]e'+ /3log {[w(X,r) +Xr]K}e +My(r,X)K (24)
where p is the (positive) co-state variable. The necessary conditions for an optimum are given
by:10
3o.(r,X)+X)—1-—Ke-"+ 3y(r,X).=0 (25) 31 dr
______+ r)-±1Ke'+P3t)K}
=0(wIcompi.slackness) (26)
— — py(r,X)= (27)
An important result can be immediately derived by simply examining (25). Since (from (10))
3<,,/3r > 0, as long as fi> 0the first term in (25) is strictly positive. Since i> 0,a
necessary condition for an optimum is that äyf3rC 0,which implies r >,-' (seeFigure 1).
Thus, as long as the workers' welfare is taken into consideration by the government, i.e. /3 >
0,taxes on capital are set above the growth maximizing level; growth is not maximized. This
result underscores that in an economy with distributive conflict, maximizing growth does not
imply maximizing welfare.
The intuition behind this result is as folLows. Consider an initial situation with rsetat
the growth-maximizing 1. Now, at r' both growth andcapitalistwelfare is maximized. A
slight increase in r (starting from r) will have a first-order effect on the level of consumption
of workers (see (10)), and only a second-order effect on. the growth rate and on capitalist
welfare. Therefore, workers would necessarily be made better off (even though they care about
growth), while capitalists would remain unhurt. Consequently, a government that attaches some
positive weight to the welfare of workers will always choose r> r, and a lower-than-maximum
growth rate.
We first consider the solution of (25)1(27) for the case of equal discount rates, ó=p.In
this case the solutions (r"andV') are given by:11
(i)￿[(1Mthen:
7-.. = (28)




Note that these solutions aretimeinvariant,and are clearly time consistent; at no point in time
does the government have an incentive to "reoptimize" and choose policies other than (28)/(31).
The solutions of this problem highlight the existence of two sregionsIn the first (high /3) the
government taxes capital and redistributes some of its revenues to the workers. In the second
(low /3) no redistribution takes place through transfers and all the government revenues are used
to finance C. Note that (28) and (31) imply that r" is increasing in /3 in both regions. In the
first region X is increasing in /3 (see (29)). Figure 2 displays these solutions. Not surprisingly,
the more the government cares about workers the more it taxes capital and redistributes to




is no redistribution occurs through direct transfers. In fact, it is possible for X" to bezero for
all /3 ￿l if 5 is small enough. Growth is inversely related to /3.
How are government policies and growth affected by the technologicalparameter, A?
The more productive is the economy (i.e., the higher is A) the smaller is the redistribution in
the first region, and the wider is the range of parameter values for whichX**= 0. However,
by applying the implicit function theorem to (31) we can also see that r** is increasing in A in
the second (low /3) region. Thus, A affects the rate of growth in the twoways. The usual
channel is via the effect on the productivity of capital, holding X and r constant. The second
one is via the effect of A on the choice of X and r by a redistributive government. Acountry
where A falls (i.e. where the economy becomes technologically more backward) wouldgrow
more slowly thanks to the first effect. The second effect could aggravate or alleviate this effect,
depending on /3. When the government is pro-labor (high /3), slower growth would be
aggravated by increased redistribution due to the second channel. When, on the other hand, the
government is pro-capital (low /3) slower growth would be alleviated thanks to a lower r.
Consider now the case in which S > p. In this situation, unlike in the case of S =p,
a new time consistency problem arises. Therefore, we need to distinguish between the 'optimal
policy" with commitment and the 'time consistent" policy. We characterize first the optima]
policy with commitment, i.e. the policy which would be chosen by a government which at time
zero can commit to a path for r and X. In the Appendix we show that the solutions of this
problem (- and $) are non-increasing functions of time, given by:13
(I) for ￿ [(1-a)A]:
= I36(fi +(1—j3)e''J' (32)
= —[0 —a)A] (33)
(ii) for < [(1_a)A]U0, -solves:
—a(la)A*}{$ + (1—rne-''}= flB(1—a)
(35)
Severai comments are in order. Suppose first that1 >3 > [(la)A]L/5,i.e.we are
in the "high fi"regionidentified in (he solution for the case of o=p.Inthis case at t=0, (32)
implies that- = r" and X=)C'.But as time elapses, both -and X fall monotonically. When
-reaches the value of [(1a)A]"", k= 0 and we switch to the second region, identified by (34)
and (35). (It is easy enough to verify that there is no discontinuity at the juncture of the two
regions.) In this region ;-continues to decline over time, as implied by (34). In fact the second
term in curly brackets on the left-hand side of (34) is increasing over time. The remaining term
on the left hand side of (34) is increasing inThus in order for the 'eft hand side of (34) to
be constant over time,has to be fauing over time.In the limit, since for (3 E [0,1]




urn == [cr(1—4A] (37)
Thus,- converges inthelimit to the growth maximizing level of r,which is also thelevel
which maximizes the capitalists' welfare. Note that this occurs regardless of the value of
P[0,1]. To summarize, the time path of optimal policies for/I E [0,1] can be described as
follows:
=r", urn -(t)= dt < °
X(0) = urnX(t) =0
dtSO,
A clear implication is that the economy's growth rate is increasing over time, dy(t)fdt > 0?
The intuition behind these results is that the social planner optimally distributes over Lime
the welfare of the two groups. Since the workers are more impatient, they obtain at the
beginning of the planning horizon more benefits, high taxes, and, for some parameter values,
positive transfers. The capitalists who, by assumption, are more patient, can "wait" until later
for their benefits.In other words, the social planner arbitrages between the two groups'
different time preferences, with the consequence that the growth rate starts out ]ow but picks up
over time.415
The optimal policies described above are, however, dynamicallyinconsistent. If the
socialplanner is allowed to reoptimize in every period, he would not follow over time the path
for randX described in (32)1(35).Thetime consistent solutions can be easily chancterized.
Problem (19) can be rewritten as follows, using the constraints:




[log K(O)]e 'dt + (log[w(r(s),X(s)) +X(s)r(s)]e
s.t. X ￿0 (38)
Since the initial capital stock, K(0) is given, from (38) it follows immediately that the solutions
{r(t),X(t)} are independent of K. But since {r,X} do not depend on the state variable, they have
to be constant over time. In the Appendix, it is shown that the time consistent solutions,



















Firstof all, notice that ifb=p, the solutions(39)1(44)simplify to (28)1(3 1) i.e. the optima!
policiesfor the caseofequal discount ntes. In fact, since the time inconsistency problem arises
only for theoptimal and the time consistent solutions are indentical for S=p.Second,it
is useful to compare the time consistent solutions (q-' ,$') with the optimal ones (iX). Suppose
that we are in the "high /3" region defined by (39). Then, simple algebra establishes the
following inequalities:




Inthe "low /3"regimeas defined by (42), condition (45)holdsas well, while (46) becomes:17
urn ￿ (O) (47)
1—'
Note that, by continuity, (45) implies that there exists a I such that t) = i. Analogous
arguments apply to (46) and to the 'low /3" region.The intuition of these results is
straightforward.The time consistency requirement prevents the implementation of the
intertemporal trade offs which would be optimal. The time consistent solution thus makes the
workers worse off at the beginning and better off later, relative to the optimal solution. The
opposite occurs for the capitalists.6 Finally, while the optimal plan implies an increasing rate
of growth for the economy, the time consistent solution requires a constant growth race.
It is useful to examine the solutions of our problem for certain parameter values. Table
I displays the optimal policies (y** and X*) for the case of equal discount factors.
Table 1: Solutions for 6 = p = 0.05
/3 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
r 0.141 0.153 0.163 0.1760.186
> 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
growth (%) 9.06 9.04 8.99 8.86 8.75
These calculations assume A = 1.5; a = 0.5.18
Table 2 displays the solutions for the case of S > p; in particular we have chosen S = 0.30 and
p = 0.05. The firstfive columnsof this tablereportthe time consistent solutions for r and A;
the second set of five columns shows the optimal solutions at time zero; the last column shows
the optimal solution for r — , which, as shown above is independent of /3.
Several comments are in order. First of all these parameter values imply that X=0 for
any value of /3.In fact, when public spending (0) is relatively productive in enhancing
productivity, it is in the interest of even a pro-labor government to channel all the fiscal
resources into G and avoid any explicit redistribution. With a higher value of a, which implies
lower productivity of 0, we obtain positive values of X for high values of /3. (Resultsare
available.) Table 1 highlights the non-monotonic decrease of the growth rate with the increase
in /3. The derivative of the growth rate with respect to /3 is increasing (in absolutevalue) with
a.
Table 2 shows that the time consistent solution for r is quite different from the optimal
solution at time zero if /3 is high. A pro-labor government would highly "reward' impatient
workers at the beginning of the planning horizon, if committments were available.
4. Distribution of Capital Ownership and Growth
Consider an economy in which the population rather than belonging to one of twogroups
has a certain distribution of capital ownership. Individual i has laborsupply C', constant over





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































laborat 1, we havethatK()=K(0)and1' =1.It will be convenient to identify the
generic consumer i by d ; that is & is the initial relative factor endowment of
K'(O)/K(O)
consumer i.7 Consumers only differ in their a's; they are identical in every other respect.
Specifically they all have the same discount rate, p.Sincewe will explicitly model voting by
majority rule, we reduce the choice set to a single dimension by setting X=0. That is, the only
issue which is voted upon is the level of the tax on capitaL8
Individual i solves the following problem:
max U' (logC')e'dt (48)
s.t. w(r)K'o +[r(i-)-r]K'=C'+ (49)
In writing the budget constraint we made use of (9) and (10) which identify the wage rate
(o(r)K) and the productivity of capital r(r). Note that we have set X=0.
It can be shown that problem (48) implies:
=(r-r - p) forevery (50)
Thus,the rate of growth of consumption is the same for every consumer, regardless of his at
The transversality condition and the resource constraint imply that21
R k'C 5 foreveryi (I)
It follows immediately that the relative shares of labor and capital,&,aretimeinvariant. This
result is, of course,cruciallydependent on the specific form of the utility function and the
existence of an identical discount rate.
Let us now consider the policy which would be chosen by consumer i, if he were a
dictator; this problem will identify voter i's ideal policy.
max U' =I (logC1)e'dt (52)
7. 1J
s.t. C1 =[oi(r)& + p]K' (53)
=y(r)K'
=y(r)K (55)
Note that (53) is obtained rearranging (49) and using (51). Constraint (55) is needed because
K enters in the definition of &.
In the Appendix it is shown that there is a time-invariant tax rate which solves this
problem, indicated by i',givenby the solution of the following:
-a(1-a)A'i=p(l-a){w(f )K&}=p(l-a){ }(56)
C'
The term in curly brackets on the right hand side of (56) represents the ratio of labor income
to total consumption of consumer of type i.It is instructive to emphasize the relationship22
between (56)andthe solution found for the government maximizing a weightedaverage of
utilities, that is equation (34). Consumer i's welfare would be maximized by a government that
places a weight on labor income (fi, in the two-class model) equal to consumer i's ratio of labor
income over total consumption.
Equation (56) implies a unique solution for r, and consumer i's preferences are single
peaked over i-. In fact, using (10), recalling that X=O in this problem, and rearranging (56) one
obtains:
{pa'[(I—a)Ar1}{r
—a(1—cr)A} = p(l—cr)?A (57)
Sincethe left hand side is strictly increasing in r and the right hand side is a constant, (57)
admits a unique solution for r. Finally, from equation (56) it iseasy to verify that r is
ruonotonically increasing in &; that is the higher the relative labor endowment, the higher the
desired tax rate on capital. Note that for a pure" capitalist, for which &=O, the optimal tax
rate is the growth maximizing one r, as shown in section 2:=
Suppose now that the decision over the tax rate if reached by pairwise comparisons with
simple majority rule. The nature of the problem is such that we can apply the median voter
theorem to it, and conclude that the tax rate chosen by majority rule is the one which solves the
following problem
r'{l - a(1-a)Ar'} = p(l-cr)(w(r )d' (58)
ca(r)gM+ p
wherea' is the median value of i. The median voter theorem can be applied because voting
occurs on a single issue, preferences are single peaked and there exists a monotonic relationship
between ideal policies and voters' relative shares of labor and capital endowment. Also, since23
the ideal policies of the consumers are constant over time and the distribution of shares is also
time invariant, it does not matter whether voting takes place only once at time zero or is
repeated every period.
Equation (58) establishes a precise relationship between the distribution of ownership of
capital and growth. A perfectly egalitarian society is one in which everybody has the same
labor/capital shares, u == 1for every i. A measure of inequality is thus (mM- 1):this
measure captures how much below the average share is the median share. For example, a very
high a implies that 50 percent of the voters have a very low share of capital, Equation (48)
establishes one of the most important result of this paper which we can summarize as follows:
Ina democracy, the more unequal is the distribution of wealth,i.e. thehigher isabove 1,
the lower istherazeof growth of the economy.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward, With an unequal distribution of
ownership, a majority of the population owns very little capital, thus favors a high tax on
capital, which in turn, reduces the growth rate.9 This result is related to the work by Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richards (1981) on voting over linear tax rates on labor
income. These authors analyze a static model in which an income tax has to be chosen, and
show that the more unequal is the distribution of productivities (thus of pre-lax income) the
higher is the tax rate (and the transfer level) desired by the median voter. We have obtained a
similar result in a dynamic model in which consumers differ not in their productivity but in their
factor endowments.






These calculations assume A =1.0,a =0.6,p= 0.05.
NQ1: This is the fithatwould yield an identical solution in the two-class model.
This table highlights the monotonic relationship between ffMandthe value of /3 which would
yield the identical solution in the two class model (i.e. /3).
5. EmpiricalEvidence
The empirical implications of this paper can be summarized as follows. When voting
plays an important role in generating policy choices, we expect to lind countries where wealth
is unevenly distributed to grow more slowly than those where the distribution is less skewed.
In countries where policies are generated less democratically, it is the weights attributed by the
policy maker to the welfare of different classes which determines growth: in particular, we
expect governments that are 'pro-capitalist" to be more conducive to growth than those that are
"pro-labor". If the theory is correct, then, there ought to be a relationship between wealth
distribution and growth, but this relationship should hold only for democracies. Given the
subjective nature of classifying non-democratic regimes as "pro-capita]" or "pro-labor" over long25
stretches of time, we have decided to test for this,moreLimited, version of the theoretical
prediction. Our model predicts a relationship between wealthdLrtribwionand growth. Since
indicators of wealth distribution and/or distribution of ownership of capital are unavailable for
a sufficiently large sample of countries, we are forced to use income distribution as a proxy for
wealth distribution.
We provide results of cross-country regressions where the average per capita GNP
growth rate (measured in percent per year over 1960-85) is regressed on three explanatory
variables:(i) GDP6O, the initial level of per capita income in 1960 (in thousands of 1980
dollars); (ii) PRIM6O, the primary-school enrollment ratio for 1960; and (iii) an income
distribution variable. All the data, except for income distribution are obtained from Barro and
Wolf (1989) and Heston and Summers (1988). Note that a measure of investment is not
included as an explanatory variable, even though it is commonly used in such regressions. The
reason is that investment is an endogenous variable in our model, and is determined
simultaneously with growth.
Ideally, we would like to have a measure of income distribution dated 1960, since,
according to our model, income distribution is a predetermined explanatory variable for growth.
However, income distribution is measured infrequently and imperfectly. We assembled the
largest sample of countries for which we could find income distribution measures dated
reasonably close to 1960. Our sources were Lecallion et al. (1984) and Jam(1975). We
managed to obtain data for 67 countries in which income distribution is measured in range of
years from 1948 (Italy) to 1972 (Botswana). For 42 of these countries and, in particular, for
19 of the 24 democracies, income distribution is measured in a period between 1956 to 1964,26
thus reasonably close to 1960.Fora list of countries see Table A-I in Appendix. Table A-2,
in Appendix, summarizes some basic statistics of our data set.
The results are reported for three groups of countries. Table 4 reports the results for the
full sample; in Table 5,weconsider a sub-sample which includes only countries with non-
democratic regimes; Table 6 shows the results for the sub-sample of democracies)° Jn all
these Tables, regressions (1) to (5)includeas an indicator of income distribution the share of
income held by different quintiles of the population, from the lowest to highest. The sixth
regression includes the share of income held by the richest 5% of the population.
The results are consistent with the prediction of the model. For all countries taken
together (Table 4), the coefficients on the income distribution variables have the sign predicted
by the theory, in some cases statistically significant at the conventional levels. However, Table
S and 6 confirm that there is a clear difference between democracies and non-democracies, as
predicted by the theory.In non-democracies (Table 5)thecoefficients on the income
distribution variable are insignificant, even though generally they have the correct sign. For the
sub-sample of democracies, on the other hand (Table 6), income distribution does appear to
influence growth in the way predicted by the model: democracies with a more equal distribution
of income grow faster. In particular the pattern of the coefficients in Table 6 suggest that an
increase in the income share of the middle class, at the expense of the richest quintile of the
population is growth enchancing. On the other hand, an increase in the income share of the
poorest quintile at the expense of the middle class may not have positive effects on growth. The



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































significant negative coefficient in every regression indicating a certain amount of "convergence";
the primary school enrollment ratio has a statistically significant positive effect on growth.
The size of the coefficients on the income distribution variables implies that the effects
of income inequality on growth is quite substantial. Consider, for instance, regression (5)in
Table 6. The avenge value for the percentage of income held by the richest quintile is about
43. A reduction of ten percent in this percentage would lead to an increase of about 1/3 of a
percentage point in the rate of growth.
The accuracy of our income distribution measure (obtained from multiple sources) may
be questionable, particularly for non-OECD economies. Therefore we rerun our regressions on
the data set recently compiled in the World Bank's WorldDevelopment Report (1990).The
sample of countries is overall much smaller (we have 38 countries), however we gain two
democracies (see Table A-i). Income distribution in this data set is measured in the late
seventiesiearly eighties; summary statistics for this sample of 38 countries are provided in Table
A-3 in Appendix.Resultsof these regressions for the entire sample and the sub-sample of
democracies are presented in Tables 7 and 8 respectively. The pattern of coefficients on the
income distribution variable is qualitatively very similar to the pattern in Tables 4 and 6. In
fact, the effect of income equality on growth appears even stronger with this data set.
Persson and Tabellini (1991) have independently obtained results consistent with our
Tables 7 and 8. They use a different source for their income distribution data, which in their
paper is measured in the mid to late seventies.
In both Persson and Tabellini (1991) and in our Tables 7 and 8, there is a simultaneity


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the time period considered but towards the end. In order to correct for that we (as well as
Persson and Tabellini)performedtwo stage least square regressions. We have chosen a compact
measure ofincome distribution(RTL) defined as the ratio oftheincomeshareof the richest 20
percent ofthe population,overthe income shareofthepoorest 40percent. Wefollowed
Persson and Tabellini in our choice of instruments for the RTL variable: GDP6O; PRIM6O;
SEC6O (the ratio of the population enrolled in secondary schools in 1960); AG6O (the ratio of
the population enrolled in the agricultural sector in 1960); ML6O (the male life expectancy in
1960).
The OLS and 2SL.S regressions for both sample of countries (democracies and non-
democracies) are presented in Table 9. The OLS regressions, not surprisingly, confirm the
results of Tables 7 and 8. The 2SL.S regressions are also consistent with the theory: in both
regressions the coefficient on RTL has the correct sign but it has a higher t-statistic (in absolute
value) for the sub-sample of democracies, where this coefficient is significant at the 5 percent
confidence level. Also the coefficient on RTL is much higher in absolute value for the
democracies than for the entire sample."
These results suggest that income inequality reduces growth in democratic countries,
while this effect disappears or it is weaker in dictatorships. In particular, it would appear that
redistributing income from the very rich to the middle class improves the growth performance
of the economy. Overall, this picture is consistent with the predictions of our model. More
generally, the result that income inequality is associated with poor economic outcomes is also
consistent with findings by Berg and Sachs (1988). They point out a statistical relationshipTable 9
Growth Regressions on RTL
(c-statistics in parentheses)
OLS 2SLS









































R2 0.16 0.47 0.19 0.44
flotswana, which is included in the OLSregressions,is not included in the
2SLS regressions for lack of data on the variables needed as instruments.29
between the frequency of debt rescheduling and measures of economicinequality. In a footnote
of their paper, they also highlight a negative correlation betweengrowth and inequality.2
6. Extensions and Conclusions
Rather than summarizing systematically all the results of thispaper, we again highlight
its empirical implications. Our model establishes connections betweenregime type, distribution
of wealth and growth. According to our model, democracies withan uneven distribution of
wealth should exhibit lower growth than democracies with more equally distributedresources.
This is because a large working class with little capital would vote for hightaxes on capital: the
positive effect on the level of workers' real incomes would be traded off against the adverse
growth consequences. "Technocratic" dictatorship, i.e., dictatorships in which the wealth-
owners control policy, should experience high growth, regardless of the distribution of
resources. On the other hand, "populist" non-democratic governments should experience low
growth and implement redistributive programs from "capitalists" to "workers." Our empirical
results are consistent with the implication that democracies with lessinequality grow faster.
More specifically, we find that a redistribution of income from the wealthiest quintile of the
population in favor of the middle class would be growth enhancing.
One can envision several extensions to our model. First of all, onemay introduce other
forms of taxation in addition to capital taxation. For instance labor income could be taxedas
well. In our model this could be easily taken into account by allowing X to benegative. For
instance, in the specification studied in Section 3, for sufficiently low values of fi, i.e., if the
government cares sufficiently about the capitalists' welfare, a negative X implying taxes on labor30
rather thantransfersmightbe chosen. Such an extension would be, however, much more
insightfulif labor werenot supplyinelastically anda taxon labor income could influence the
leisure-labor choice of workers.
A second extension for the model with "workers" and "capitalists" would be to make fi
endogenousby explicitly modelling costly lobbying activities, as in the endogenous tariffs
literature. "High" and "low" fiwouldthen be the results of high and low relative costs of
workers' and capitalists' lobbying activities (and the relative productivities of these activities in
influencing government decisions). This extension is relatively easy if we assume an exogenous
function relating the level of lobbying efforts of the two groups to the value of 3. Lobbying
efforts in turn could be modelled as losses of income and/or utility. Income can be used to
directly 'bribe" politicians; losses of utility capture the amount of time and effort invested in
politicalaction.'3
A third much more difficult extension would be to allow for time varying shares of labor
and capital, that is building a model in which different consumers save at different rates. It is
interesting to note that this would introduce not only complicated economic dynamics but also
complicated voting decisions. In fact, if capital/labor shares change over time the identity of
the median voter also changes over time.'1 Thus different policy paths would be achieved
depending on whether voting takes place only once at the beginning of the planning horizon or
repeatedly.31
Notes
I. Thistime inconsistencyproblem in capital taxation is closely related to that pointed out by
Fischer (1980).Seealso thediscussion inRodrik (1990).
2.It is easy to see that cannot converge to zero. Remember that if -= 0,G =0,y =0and
C1 =0imptying an infinite disutility.
3. If fl=0 (/3=1), at time zero the government adopts the policy most desired by thecapitalist
(workers) and such policy is never changed. For the two extreme values of 3, growth is time
invariant.
4. In an overlapping generation model this kind of intertemporal redistributions would imply
redistribution across generations which may be difficult to achieve since the interests of future
generations may not be represented in today's political system.
5. In fact, suppose not. Then rand X would change over time independently of Ku). It iseasy
to verify that such a solution cannot be time consistent.
6. It is instructive to highlight a connection between our results and those recently obtained by
Boylen, Ledyard and McKelvey (1990). They study a Solow-type growth model in which voters
with different discount factors choose by majority rule a growth path for theeconomy. If
commitments are available (i.e. voting occurs only in period zero and the entire growth path can
be chosen forever) than very high discount factor voters may form a coalition vith tow discount
factor voters by means of intertemporal trade offs. The possibility of forming these coalitions
between voters with opposite preferences destroys any "median Voter' equilibrium. However,
if the time consistency requirement is imposed on this problem (by voting even period) these32
coalitions of voters are "non credible' and the growth path most preferred by the voter with the
median discount rate emerges as the unique equilibrium. The analogy is in this tack of
credibility of intertemporal trade-offs between voters, or "classes," with different discount
factors.
7.Astatic version of a similar model is considered in the trade-policy context by Mayer (1984).
8. Note that it may be the case that for a range of parameter values, X=0 would actually be
preferred by a majority of voters, but we do not investigate explicitly this case.
9.Itis perfectly admissible in our model for the median voter to hold no capital, in which case
—.. Theright hand side of (48) converges to I as-.. Itis easy to see that the tax
rate which is chosen in this case is identical to the one which would be chosen by a pro-labor
government completely disregarding the capitalists' interests, i.e. when fi= 1in the model
examined in section 3.
10.Theclassification of countries as democracies or not is generally unambiguous. We defined
as a "democracy" a country in which general elections are regularly held and voters can choose
between at least two parties.Jn any event, we classified the countries before running any
regression and we never readjusted the classification. For the few "ambiguous" countries, i.e.
countries which had a regime change in the sample period, such as Spain, Greece and Chile, we
checked whether dropping these countries or changing their classification, affected significantly
our results. This analysis confirmed that our results are robust to these sensitivity tests.
11. We also performed these regressions using the log of RTL. The results (available upon
request) are very similar to those presented in Table 9.33
12.Berg and Sachs (1988) however do not. distinguish between democracies and non-
democraciesanddo not control for other factors influencing growth.
13.Models ofendogenous growth with lobbying activitieshave been recently proposed by
Terrones (1989) andMohtadiandRoe (1990).These models however, arebasedupon the
assumption of a 'representative" consumer-lobbyist.They do not consider a labor/capital
redistributiveconflict.
14. Perotti (1990) discusses a model ofrepeated votingin a growth model. Tabellini and
Alesina (1990) studyatwoperiod model withstochastic changes iii the identity of the median
voter.34
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APPENDIX
1..)Solution of Droblem (25)I(27t
Let us define y1 as the partialderivativeof y with respect to x. Suppose X > 0. Then
from (25) and (26) one obtains:
_______ =y,fr,X) (Al)
w(r,X)+ry(r,X)
Using the definitions of 'y and r, (A. I) implies
(1-X)r = (A.2)
Equation(27) can be rewritten as follows:
= — (1-.f3)!__. - (A.3)
p plC plC
IfX > 0 then the following condition holds:
= (A.4)
By taking time derivatives of (25), using (A.4) and rearranging, one obnins:
(A.5)
C
Using(A.3) arid (A.5) one obtains:38
a =(1—)!__+ (A.6)
pcK pK
Using (A.6) and(25),some algebra establishes the following:
+)vr = o{1+±j"i (A.7)
Let us consider first the case of .5 =p, inwhich case the right-hand side of (A.7) simplifies to





Note that (A.8) and (A.9) which reproduce (28) and (29) in the text, hold only for X >0,thus
for>[1_a)A]0
3
Considernow thecase3>p. Firstof all, note that at t0, (A.8) and (A.9) are the
solutions of this case as well. More generally, the solution, using (10), (A.7) and (A.2) again
is given by:
1- =j33{fl+(1—fe'}' (A.10)
which reproduce (32) and (33) in the text. Once again, since these solutions are obtained for39
=1[(l—ct)A (A.11)
X >0,they hold only fori > [(1—cx)A].
Letusconsider now the case ofX = 0. Considerfirstthecase 5= p; thustherelevant
first-order conditions are(25)andasimplified version of (27):
—ry(r,X) = (A.12)
Byrearranging (25) one obtains:
=[(r,X)+Xr]'y(r,X)
(A.13) fl[w(r,X) +X]
(A.5) and (A. 12) imply (recalling that.2_ =
= -o-L (A.14) p C
(A.13) and(A.14) imply after substitutingthe expressions for co(r,X),yfrX), o,7(r,X) and y,(r,X)
atN = 0:
(A.15)
whichis equation (31) in the text.
An analogous procedure for the case > p, using (27) in the text rather than (A-12)40
leads to (34) in the text.
2.) The time consistent solutions of oroblem (25)1(27)
As arguedin the text the time consistent solutionsfor (randX) have to be constant over
time.For constant r and X, (38) is equivalent to:




Problem (A. 16) canberewritten as:
maxTfy(r,X) + [log[w(r,X)+Xr]}+'y(r,X) (A.18)
r,X P 6
s.t ? ￿ 0.
Thesolutions (39)1(44)in the text can be obtained as a result of this optimization problem.
3.)Solutionof problem (42)1(45).
The Hamiltonian of this problem can be written as follows:
H =log([o(r)_!_K+p]K'}r'+M17fr)K'+1z27(r)K (A.19)
The first order conditions areasfollows:41
+ + 1127,fr)K=0 (A.20)
= — 1117(r) (A.21) ci
= - 1127(r) = (A.22) ci
From(A.17) one obtains:
+2 -p = - (A.23) C'
112
K'From (A.20)/(A.23), recalling that y(r) =£: oneobtains: In (A.23)
c
6i' + + P4 __________ = y(r) — — p (A.24)
+ (Jir(T)l' c
Substitutingthe expressions for y,(r), wfr)and wØ-) in(A.24) and recalling that





Canada(61) $ * Bolivia(68)
Colombia (64) * Botswana(72) $ *
CostaRica (69) * Brazil(60) *
Denmark(63) * Burma(58)
Finland (62) * Chad(58)
France (62) * Chile(68)
Cermany (64) * DominicanRepublic (69) $
Creece (57) Egypt (64-65) $
India (56-57) * ElSalvador (65)
Israel (57) * Gabon(60)
Italy (48) * Ghana#*
Jamaica(58) * Guatemala(66) $ *
Japan(57-58) * Uonduras(67-68) $
Malaysia (63) * HongKong (71) $ *
Netherlands(62) * Indonesia(71) $ *
NewZealand (66) S * Iran(59) $
Norway (63) * Iraq(56)
Spain (64-65) $ * IvoryCoast (59) *
SriLanka (63) * Kenya(69) $
Sweden (63) * Korea(66)
Switzerland* Madagascar(60)
United States (69) * Malawi(69) $
United Kingdom (64) * Mexico(63)




















The year following each country indicates the date in which income
distribution is measured for the regressions in Tables 4. 5 and 6.
*— countriesincluded in the regressions of Tables 7. 8 and 9. *—countries
not included in Tables 4, S and 6.$ —dataobtained from Jam (1975); for
all other countries data are from Lecallion et al. (1986).Table A-2




GR6085 2.18 1.86 -2.83 6.62
GDP6O 2.04 1.86 0.21 7.38
PRIM6O 77.61 30.58 5.00 144.00
Lowest 20% 5.18 2.02 1.60 10.00
Second 20% 9.15 2.41 4.20 14.00
Third 20% 13.27 3.03 7.00 18.80
Fourth 20% 19.82 3.39 12.40 26.40
Highest 20% 52.58 8.93 36.00 71.00
Highest 5% 26.47 9.17 11.20 48.30Table A-3




CR6085 2.66 1.83 -1.70 7.45
CDP6O 2.89 2.15 0.44 7.38
PRLM6O 90.42 26.83 30.00 144.00
Lowest 20% 5.95 1.74 2.40 9.80
Second 20% 10.89 2.00 5.70 19.70
Third 20% 15.81 2.18 10.70 18.90
Fourth 20% 22.47 1.94 18.40 25.60
Highest 20% 44.89 7.00 36.00 62.60
Highest 10% 29.36 6.96 20.80 46.20